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I. INTRODUCTION
The tragic consequences of myths, misunderstandings, misin-
formation, miscommunication, and misperceptions have been well
documented in American history. With each evil, the government was
responsible for perpetuating and then eventually quelling the evil. In
1857, for example, the Supreme Court decided Dred Scott v. Sanford,"
ruling that people of African descent could never be citizens of the
* B.A., Queens College in Flushing, NY, 2003. J.D., American University, May 2007.
1. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
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United States, thereby relegating them to status of mere property. 2
Congress and the States later rectified this egregious error by amend-
ing the Constitution. 3 This landmark case epitomizes the inevitable
result inequity and inequality when a society is pervaded with atti-
tudes based on stereotypes, misunderstanding, and ignorance. Though
the evil of race-based slavery was remedied, this did not mark the
death of shame in America. The subjugation of another minority per-
sisted, as individuals with disabilities remained without legal
recourse. Congress recognized "discrimination against individuals
with disabilities persists in such critical areas as employment, hous-
ing, public accommodations, education, transportation, communica-
tion, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and ac-
cess to public services" and, in response, enacted the American with
Disabilities Act ("ADA"). 4
This paper discusses a problem that persists despite the enact-
ment of the ADA - victimization of individuals with disabilities
because of strongly ingrained attitudes, fears, and stereotypes. Part I
defines the ADA generally and focuses on the statutory provision most
relevant in this paper, the definition of "disability" with respect to an
individual. More specifically, this paper explores the "regarded as"
prong of the definition and explains the three rationales an individual
may use to qualify as "disabled" to bring suit under the "regarded as"
prong. Part II discusses the semantics of "reasonable accommodation."
This section explores reasonable accommodations for persons who are
perceived as disabled, analyzing the inquiry principally through the
lens of the circuits that have ruled on the issue. Finally, Part III dis-
cusses misperception of disability and whether it results in
discrimination adequate to justify reasonable accommodations. Fur-
thermore, this section explores and discusses whether the inquiry
about accommodation should change depending on the rationale the
plaintiff puts forth for his/her qualification in regard to coverage under
the "regarded as" prong of the ADA. Ultimately, this paper argues and
concludes that individuals who are erroneously believed to be disabled
should be accommodated commensurate with the nature and extent of
the employer's belief and the actual state of the person's impairment or
non-impairment. To effectuate such a course, this paper recommends
that Congress amend the ADA to provide an appropriate remedial
scheme for individuals who are "regarded as" disabled and who suffer
2. Id. at 395.
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (freeing slaves) and U.S. CONST. amend. XIV
(providing a broad definition of citizenship and according equal protection to all citizens).
4. American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (3) (2000).
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in their employment conditions as a result of their employers'
misperceptions.
II. THE ADA AND ITS "REGARDED As" PRONG
Title I of the ADA provides that "No covered entity shall dis-
criminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the
'disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, ...
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensa-
tion, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment."5 In relevant part, the ADA defines a person with a disa-
bility as an individual who has "a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such indi-
vidual" or who is "regarded as having such an impairment."6
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"),
the agency charged with enforcing Title I of the ADA, has issued regu-
lations offering interpretive guidance to define disability, including
guidance on general provisions that are outside the purview of explicit
EEOC authority. 7 These regulations provide that "regarded as having
such impairment" means:
(1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially
limit major life activities but is treated by a covered entity as con-
stituting such limitation;
(2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward
such impairment; or
(3) Has none of the impairments defined [under physical or mental
impairments] but is treated by a covered entity as having a sub-
stantially limiting impairment.8
These three rationales for bringing suit under the "regarded as" prong
are discussed below.
A. Actual Impairment Treated as Substantially Limiting a
Major Life Activity
Most cases that are brought under the "regarded as" prong as-
sert that the individual has an actual impairment, which, though not
5. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2000).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2) (2000).
7. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 479 (1999) (noting that "no
agency . . . has been given authority to issue regulations implementing the generally
applicable provisions of the ADA ... which fall outside Titles I-V").
8. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (1) (1)-(3) (2001).
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substantially limiting, is treated as such by the employer. The preva-
lence of this rationale in "regarded as" suits indicates that employers
are more likely to have false perceptions about a condition that is con-
spicuously present or one about which it has been notified - an actual
impairment - than one which is hidden or of which it has no
knowledge.
In E.E.O.C. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., the employer
appealed a partial summary judgment granted to the EEOC on a suit
brought on behalf of an employee who worked as a lab operator in the
company's chemical plant.9 The employee was diagnosed with multi-
ple medical conditions that made it increasingly difficult for her to
walk but for which she received treatment. 10 The employee received
annual physical examinations from the company's plant physicians
who eventually restricted her from "standing for more than ten min-
utes, walking more than one hundred feet without resting, working in
a stooped position, or working more than eight hours.""1 A year after
the company's physicians restricted her in this manner, the company
transferred the employee to the sedentary position of lab clerk.1 2 The
company's physicians eventually became concerned about the em-
ployee's ability to walk safely at the plant and to evacuate safely in an
emergency.13 After conducting a Functional Capacity Evaluation
("FCE") of the employee, the results of the FCE confirmed her walking
impairment and the company's physicians restricted her from walking
anywhere in the plant.1 4 The employee attempted to be reinstated, but
the company refused even though the employee demonstrated that she
could walk the evacuation route without assistance. 15 The district
court found that the employer regarded the employee as disabled
under the ADA because it perceived her as substantially limited in the
major life activity of walking.16 The Fifth Circuit agreed that the com-
pany did indeed regard the employee as disabled within the meaning of
the ADA because, as the district court found, the company placed
broad restrictions on the employee because of its perceptions that she
was "incapable of walking" and "permanently disabled from walk-
9. E.E.O.C. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 480 F.3d 724, 727 (5th Cir. 2007).
10. Id. at 727.
11. Id. at 728.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. (discussing how this company-imposed immobility left the employee unable to
evacuate the plant in an emergency, and the company, contending that ability to evacuate
was required of all employees, placed the employee on permanent disability).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 729.
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ing."17 Furthermore, the appellate court relied on the lower court's
finding that the company considered her "substantially impaired in
walking" because the company thought she "could not dependably be
counted on to walk safely."I8
In LeVelle v. Penske Logistics, a terminated employee sued his
employer alleging that he was discharged after the company learned
he was subject to, and working under, doctor-recommended lifting re-
strictions.1 9 The company official testified to the jury that she was
concerned that if a driver who had already suffered an on-the-job in-
jury returned to work, he could re-injure himself.20 When the
employee was informed he could not work as a driver because of his
medical restrictions, the employee allegedly asked if he could work at
the company in some other capacity. 21 At trial, the company official
testified that she did not consider any alternative to termination of the
employee. 22 The letter that informed the employee of his termination
stated, "[d]ue to no work being available at this time, you are termi-
nated effective immediately."23 A jury found that the employer
regarded the employee as disabled.24 The appellate court found that
evidence in the record supported the verdict, since there were reasona-
ble inferences suggesting the company viewed him as unable to
perform a broad range of jobs and especially since a company official
had testified that she did not consider the employee for any other posi-
tion because of his restrictions. 25 The court also noted that the
evidence permitted the conclusion that the company's actions were mo-
tivated by "myths, fears, or stereotypes" about the employee's
perceived disability instead of his actual ability to work.26
In Capobianco v. City of New York, a discharged sanitation
worker brought suit against the city and sanitation department alleg-
ing, inter alia, that he was "regarded as" disabled because the city
perceived him as substantially limited in the major life activity of see-
ing.27 The plaintiff, who performed driving and garbage collecting
functions, was diagnosed with night blindness, and despite having no
17. Id.
18. Id
19. LeVelle v. Penske Logistics, 197 Fed. Appx. 729, 731 (10th Cir. 2006).
20. Id. at 732.
21. Id. at 732-33.
22. Id. at 733.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 734.
25. Id. at 735.
26. Id. at 736.
27. Capobianco v. City of New York, 422 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 2005).
239
FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW Vol. 2:1:235
ocular hindrances to driving in the daytime, the department confined
him to clerical duties during daylight work hours. 28 The Second Cir-
cuit disagreed with the district court's holding that the employee had
not presented adequate evidence for a reasonable jury to find he was
"regarded as" disabled. 29 The appellate court found there was substan-
tial evidence in the record showing that the department regarded the
employee as disabled,30 including that the company placed the em-
ployee in position not to drive at all instead of restricting him from
night driving. 31 Additionally, the department permitted the employee
to perform only clerical-type duties for two months even though he was
capable of performing all sanitation worker duties during the day.32 A
supervisor refused to evaluate him for two performance periods be-
cause the supervisor considered him to be "unrateable" even though he
was subsequently rated by a different supervisor for performing satis-
factorily.33  In addition, the Personnel Management division
recommended he be terminated because it believed he was "unable to
perform in title duties of a sanitation worker due to Myopic Macular
Degeneration" even though he did not even have this particular condi-
tion.34 The appellate court held that a jury could reasonably find the
department perceived the employee as having a "degenerating impair-
ment that prevented him from much more than merely driving at
night, and that [the department of sanitation] believed [the em-
ployee's] condition substantially limited his ability to see as compared
to the average person in the general population." 35
In all three cases, "society's accumulated myths and fears about
disability and disease [we]re as handicapping as [we]re the physical
limitations that flow[ed] from an actual impairment."36 In Du Pont de
Nemours, the employee had a physical impairment that was well docu-
mented medically.3 7 However, it was not so substantially limiting that
it affected her walking capability in every facet of life.38 The company,
however, misperceived the impairment as having such a limiting effect
28. Id. at 51-53.
29. Id. at 60.
30. Id. at 58.
31.- Id. at 60.
32. Id. at 51.
33. Id. at 52.
34. Id. at 60.
35. Id.
36. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489 (quoting Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S.
273, 284 (1987)).
37. Du Pont de Nemours, 480 F.3d at 727-28.
38. Id. at 728.
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and it treated her accordingly. 39 In LeVelle, the employee had a limit-
ing impairment but he was treated as if he had a substantially limiting
impairment and was locked out of the employer's workforce as a result
of this false perception. 40 In Capobianco, the department misconceived
the nature of the employee's condition when they thought it was degen-
erating.41 The employer proceeded to treat an actual impairment as a
substantially limiting impairment which was different from the im-
pairment that the employee actually had, and reacted to the employee
differently as a result of its own misinformed unofficial diagnosis. 4
2
These cases keenly show the adverse effects that misperception
about disability can have on individuals and the unemployment rates
of disabled individuals in our economy. The "regarded as" prong pro-
tects against adverse employment actions when an individual may be
limited in some capacity but not to an extent that warrants his exclu-
sion from the workforce. Suits like these, which acknowledge the
breadth of the ADA's protection, serve to reinforce the importance of
compliance with the ADA and also to deter future wrongful termina-
tion by employers. More importantly, victories for plaintiffs in
"regarded as" suits will likely make employers think twice before they
let their own preconceived notions about a particular impairment in-
fluence the employment decisions they make with respect to an
employee who has such an impairment. Perhaps these victories will
lead to better treatment of impaired individuals who are qualified to
perform work, but who may be easily misidentified and mischaracter-
ized as unable to function effectively in their respective workplaces.
B. Actual Impairment that Substantially Limits a Major Life
Activity Only Because of Others' Attitudes
On some occasions, an individual's impairment may only have a
substantially limiting effect on a major life activity because of the way
the attitudes of others influence the person. "An impairment [of this
nature] might not diminish a person's physical or mental capabilities,
but could nevertheless substantially limit that person's ability to work
as a result of the negative reactions of others to the impairment."
43
In EEOC v. Heartway Corp., an employee with Hepatitis C who
worked as a dietary aide and cook for a nursing home was terminated
39. Id.
40. LeVelle, 197 Fed. Appx. at 731-32.
41. Capobianco, 422 F.3d at 50-53.
42. Id. at 53.
43. Arline, 480 U.S. at 283.
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from her position because the company learned of the employee's condi-
tion and an official told the employee, "you having Hepatitis C, you will
not work in our kitchen. '44 During the EEOC's investigation of the
employee's complaint, the same company official asked the EEOC in-
vestigator, "how would you like to eat food containing her blood, if she
ever cut her finger"; the company official subsequently commented to
the investigator that "if this got out to their clients they[ ] would have a
mass exodus from their nursing home."45 The EEOC filed suit on be-
half of the employee alleging that the company terminated the
employee because it regarded her as disabled.46
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the jury
verdict and concluded there was sufficient evidentiary basis for a rea-
sonable jury to find the company treated the employee's impairment
"as significantly restricting her ability to perform either a class of jobs
or a broad range ofjobs in various classes."47 The court pointed to com-
ments made by the company official that reflected how the company
viewed the employee as not only unable to perform the job in its
kitchen, but also, that it thought it was unsafe or unsanitary for her to
continue cooking food for its clientele. 48 Noting the disabling effects
that misperception could have, the court pointed to the company offi-
cial's "mass exodus" comment, which implied the employee might not
be able to properly perform her job because of how others might react
when they learned she had Hepatitis C. 49 To complete the inquiry as
to whether the employee was "regarded as" being excluded from a
broad range of jobs, and therefore substantially limited in the major
life activity of working, the court considered the testimony of an EEOC
economist who testified that "the tasks, education, and experience rele-
vant to the job of dietary aide correspond to two job groups that, in her
opinion, 'account for about 55 percent of all jobs in the service worker
category' in the relevant geographic area."50 As such, the court con-
cluded that the employee was precluded from a broad range of jobs. 51
In Bryant v. Troy Auto Parts Warehouse, Inc., the plaintiff, a
high school graduate who was six feet tall and who weighed more than
44. EEOC v. Heartway Corp., 466 F.3d. 1156, 1159 (10th Cir. 2006).
45. Id. at 1159-60.
46. Id. at 1160.
47. Id. at 1165.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1166.
50. Id. at 1165.
51. Id. at 1162.
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350 pounds, applied for a position with Troy Auto Parts.52 When he
filled out the application, he indicated he was interested in a delivery
position and was subsequently hired in what he believed to be a posi-
tion as a delivery/stock worker.5 3 Because the plaintiff was hired at
someone's recommendation, the co-owners of Troy Auto Parts had
never met him prior to his employment and they were both unaware of
his physical stature.54 Prior to their in-person meeting with the plain-
tiff, the owners allowed him to use any of their three delivery
vehicles. 55 When one of the owners eventually met him, the owners
restricted his use of certain vehicles because the co-owner, who met the
plaintiff, believed he was too heavy to drive some of the cars. 56 The
plaintiff subsequently made only few deliveries.5 7 Early in his employ-
ment, one of the owners expressed concern about plaintiffs health -
concerns that were not alleviated by plaintiffs mother's assurances to
the owner that her son did not have a heart problem or high blood
pressure.58
In considering the employer's motion for summary judgment,
the court discussed the plaintiffs allegation that the company re-
garded him as disabled.5 9 The court stated that "while obesity itself
may not rise to the level of a disability within the ADA, other factors
may further limit an individual's life activities. One such factor is the
perception of others."60 The court noted "an individual who is disfig-
ured in some way may not be limited in any of the major life activities,
but an employer may discriminate against such an individual because
of the negative reactions of others."61 The court proceeded to discuss
how an individual might be "substantially impaired only because of the
attitudes of others" and noted that the plaintiff was not trained for
counter work even though another employee with less experience was
given such training.62 Thus, the court concluded there were genuine
52. Bryant v. Troy Auto Parts Warehouse, Inc., No. IP 95-1654-C-D/F, 1997 WL
441288, at *1 (S.D. Ind. 1997).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. It is unclear whether plaintiff made use of all the vehicles early in his
employment with the company, but he was permitted to do so.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at *3-6
60. Id. at *4.
61. Id.
62. Id. (inferring that the employer's proffered reasons for denying the training to
plaintiff - that is, plaintiff was not hired for this position and that counter work ,requires
very specific experience - were pretextual).
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issues of material fact as to whether plaintiff was limited in his ability
to ... because of the company's perceptions and so it denied the em-
ployer's motion for summary judgment. 63
In Bryant, it was possible that because of bias against obese in-
dividuals, the employer limited the scope of the plaintiffs participation
at work. Even though plaintiffs size was unrelated to his ability to
function in this particular workplace, the employer's preconceived no-
tions and attitudes may have served to substantially limit plaintiff in'
his duties. As such, even though the Bryant court did not specify that
working would be the major life activity that was substantially limited,
it implied that working would be the major life activity affected by atti-
tudinal barriers that caused plaintiff to be limited in his job duties.64
Furthermore, the court recognized that even though plaintiffs obese
condition was not a physical impairment that was treated as substan-
tially limiting, negative perceptions and attitudes could cause the
condition to be substantially limiting in one or more major life activi-
ties.65 Similarly, In Heartway Corp., the employee had an impairment,
Hepatitis C, which, by itself, had no impact on her ability to work effec-
tively in her position.66 However, because of the strong convictions of
the company officials, the employee was viewed as unable to perform a
wide range of jobs and she became substantially limited in her abilities
by virtue of their attitudes.
These two cases are the types of "regarded as" suits that accen-
tuate the importance of the second rationale for bringing a "regarded
as" suit. If it was not possible to bring suit when an impairment was
only substantially limiting because of the way others reacted to it,
these two employees would have been without legal recourse, espe-
cially since the Bryant court specifically rejected the applicability of
the first rationale (actual impairment not substantially limiting but
treated as such) to that plaintiffs situation. 67
C. Employee Has No Impairment but is Treated as Having a
Substantially Limiting Impairment
There are certain conditions that are particularly amenable to
misperception that are not necessarily covered under the ADA as im-
63. Id. at *7.
64. See id. at *3-6.
65. See id. at *4.
66. See 466 F.3d. at 1159
67. See id. (noting that there is no evidence to suggest that the company limited
plaintiffs duties because it perceived he had health problems).
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pairments. Usually, these conditions are physically manifested and
therefore susceptible to sensory discernment. For example, a person
who is obese may not weigh enough to rise to the threshold level
needed for ADA coverage but such an individual may be misconstrued
as having limited capabilities or having substantial limitations in cer-
tain activities; or in the case of emotional responses, a person whose
expression shows profound sadness may be perceived to be depressed
even though that person does not have such a mental impairment. The
third rationale of the "regarded as" prong covers situations where the
employer erroneously believes non-impaired individuals are substan-
tially impaired and then makes employment decisions based on its
misperceptions.
In Williams v. Cascade United Methodist Church, the plaintiff,
a Maintenance and Security Coordinator for the church, was required
to perform and oversee custodial duties, including maintenance ser-
vices. 68 After working for the church for over ten years, the plaintiff
injured his right shoulder and neck while performing lawn mainte-
nance on church grounds. 69 Post-surgery and initial disability ratings
by doctors, the plaintiff was released to return to work without restric-
tion.70 There was uncertainty as to whether the plaintiff could return
to work because of conflicting information the company received to this
effect; however, the plaintiff insisted that he was capable of performing
the duties. 71 There was a dispute about whether the company re-
quested the plaintiff to provide additional documentation that he was
fit to return to work.72 The church eventually terminated him and
solicited applications for a custodian position for which plaintiff did not
apply.73 The plaintiff filed suit alleging that the church regarded him
as disabled even though he had no impairment 74 - a contention that
lead the plaintiff to use the third prong (no impairment) instead of the
first prong, wherein he ostensibly could have argued that he had neck
and shoulder impairments which, though not substantially limiting,
were treated as such.75 The defendant church challenged this allega-
tion even though it conceded that the plaintiff indicated he wanted to
work and his treating physicians officially released him to return to
68. Williams v. Cascade United Methodist Church, No. C1V.A.1:00-CV3238TWT, 2002
WL 400805, at * 1 (N.D.Ga. Jan. 15, 2002).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at *1-2.
73. Id. at *2-3.
74. Id. at *4.
75. See id.
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work.76 The church claimed it requested plaintiff to provide additional
documentation showing he was fit to return to work and the plaintiffs
failure to do so justified his termination. 77 The district court refused to
grant the employer's motion for summary judgment because both
plaintiff and his doctors had affirmed his ability to return to work, but
the defendant persisted in refusing to allow him to do so, thereby creat-
ing a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the church regarded
plaintiff as having a substantially limiting impairment even though he
had none.78
In EEOC v. Texas Bus Lines, the EEOC filed suit on behalf of an
obese job applicant, Arazella Manuel, alleging the company refused to
hire her because it regarded her as disabled under the ADA.79 After
Manuel applied to the company for a bus driver position, she was inter-
viewed, her references were checked, and she was administered a road
test which she successfully passed.80 Manuel then underwent a requi-
site physical examination, after which the doctor who examined her
determined she was not qualified for the position because as a "mor-
bidly obese woman, [she] would not be able to move swiftly in the event
of an accident."8 ' Because the company conceded that Manuel would
have been hired had it not been for the doctor's findings, the court
closely scrutinized the basis for the company's or the doctor's find-
ings.8 2 The court noted that the doctor's conclusion was not based on
any medical tests or findings and his examination revealed no signifi-
cant medical problems; on the contrary, the medical examination form
stated Manuel was "normal" in all categories.8 3 The court also found
that the company was on notice that the doctor's findings, which dis-
qualified the candidate for the position, were inconsistent with the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, which did not list impaired
mobility as a per se disqualifying condition.8 4 The court concluded the
company decided not to hire Manuel because of a perception of disabil-
ity based on "myth, fear, or stereotype" and the company regarded her
as disabled and unable to work as a driver based on alleged impaired
mobility - a perception due to "blind reliance" on a limited medical ex-
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at *5.
79. EEOC v. Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. 965, 975 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
80. Id. at 967.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 976.
83. Id. at 968.
84. Id.
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amination.8 5 The court held that the company perceived Manuel as an
individual with a substantially limiting impairment even thought he
really did not have such an impairment. As such, Texas Bus Lines was
liable under the "regarded as" prong of the ADA.8 6
In Williams, because the plaintiff suffered from a previous in-
jury, the employer, in fear of potential liability, terminated him.8 7 In
cases where the individual has no impairment but is regarded as hav-
ing a substantially limiting one, the ADA is particularly useful because
it prevents employers from acting on assumptions about individuals.
Instead, it encourages employers to conduct the requisite review of in-
dividual's capabilities on a case-by-case basis. This implicit ADA
mandate of analyzing employees' particular qualifications was empha-
sized in Texas Bus Lines because the company's failure to review the
job applicant's actual qualifications when the employer judged her
based on superficial and irrelevant characteristics was the principal
reason it was held liable.88 In both cases, the intent of the ADA's "re-
garded as" prong was effectuated because the courts held employment
decisions based on irrational fears and preconceived prejudices to be
impermissible.
III. THE SEMANTICS OF "REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION"
"The starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of
the statute itself." 9 The ADA states, "the term 'reasonable accommo-
dation' may include (A) making existing facilities . . . readily accessible
to and usable by [disabled individuals]; and (B) job restructuring, part-
time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position,
acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate ad-
justment or modifications of examinations, training materials or
policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other
similar accommodations .... ."90 The term "may" indicates that the
enumerated reasonable accommodations are illustrative not exhaus-
tive. The suggestion of "other similar accommodations" further
emphasizes this point. Because Congressional intent may be discerned
by application of traditional tools of statutory construction, 91 analysis
85. Id. at 979.
86. Id.
87. Williams, 2002 WL 400805, at *2.
88. See Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. at 978-79.
89. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (9) (1990) (emphasis added).
91. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, n.9
(1984).
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of the provisions gives insight into Congress' intent. Congress, though
cursorily defining "reasonable accommodation," did not separately de-
fine the terms "reasonable" and "accommodation. '92 If it wanted to
ascribe specific meanings to those terms, it would have done so. "When
a [term] is not defined by statute, we normally construe it in accord
with its ordinary or natural meaning."93 Congress' failure to include
separate definitions suggests that those terms are generally under-
stood in everyday application. According to Black's Law Dictionary,
"reasonable" means "fair, proper, or moderate under the circum-
stances."94 The term "accommodation" means "the act or an instance of
making a change or provision for someone." 95 Reasonableness, there-
fore, depends on the particular situation and is a term of relative
application and meaning.
The EEOC enforcement guidance provides that "an accommoda-
tion is any change in the work environment or in the way things are
customarily done that enables an individual with a disability to enjoy
equal employment opportunities."96 Further, the EEOC identifies
three categories of reasonable accommodations: (1) "modifications or
adjustments to a job application process . . ." (2) modifications or ad-
justments to the work environment, or to the matter or circumstances
under which the position . . . is customarily performed that enable a
qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions
of the position or (3) modifications or adjustments that enable [quali-
fied disabled employees] to enjoy equal benefits ... as other similarly
situated employees without disabilities."97
In understanding and applying the notion of a "reasonable ac-
commodation" once the term's plain meaning has been discerned,
analysis of its statutory context is mandated. The ADA states that it is
discrimination when an employer does not "make reasonable accommo-
dations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability."98 Because the ADA defines "dis-
ability" to include individuals with actual disabilities as well as
perceived disabilities, 99 the question arises as to whether individuals
perceived to be disabled should be reasonably accommodated. The
92. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (9) (1990).
93. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993).
94. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added).
95. Id.
96. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (o) (1997).
97. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (o) (1) (i-iii) (2000).
98. 42 U.S.C. §12112 (b) (5) (2000).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2) (1990).
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plain language of the ADA does not distinguish between these two
ways of qualifying as "disabled" when it states that a qualified disabled
individual is entitled to reasonable accommodation. Perhaps because
it seems counterintuitive to reasonably accommodate someone who is
not actually disabled but merely perceived to be so, courts have been
inconsistent in answering the question of when it is appropriate to or-
der such reasonable accommodations for "regarded as" plaintiffs.
A. The Circuit Split on Providing Reasonable Accommodations to
"Regarded As" Plaintiffs100
"The plain language of the ADA's interlocking statutory defini-
tions includes within the rubric of a 'qualified individual with a
disability' protected by the ADA individuals (1) regarded as disabled
but (2) who, with reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the position that they hold."1° 1 In regard to the plain lan-
guage interpretation, the First, Third, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits
have determined that reasonable accommodations are available to in-
dividuals who are merely "regarded as" disabled. 10 2 The Fifth, Sixth,
100. The discussion in this paper is focused on reasonable accommodations for
"regarded as" plaintiffs when "essential functions" are at issue. The extent to which an
employer might be required to provide reasonable accommodations for the non-essential
functions the employee is asked to perform is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the
author notes that the plain language of the ADA allows a possible reasonable
accommodation for qualified individuals with disabilities to be the elimination of non-
essential functions. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); E.E.O.C. v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd.,
55 F.3d 1276, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995) (discussing same). As such, the author speculates that
courts that hold reasonable accommodations are available to "regarded as" plaintiffs will
likewise hold that such reasonable accommodations are available when the "regarded as"
plaintiff needs a reasonable accommodation for a non-essential function or when the
reasonable accommodation can be job-restructuring in the form of elimination of the non-
essential function.
101. Kelly v. Metallics West, Inc., 410 F.3d 670, 675 (10th Cir. 2005).
102. See e.g., Kelly, 410 F.3d at 675; D'Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220
(11th Cir. 2005); Williams v. Philadelphia Housing Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 773-76
(3d Cir. 2004); Katz v. City Metal Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir.1996); See also Elizabeth
Mills, How Bizarre? The Application of Reasonable Accommodation To Employees
"Regarded As" Disabled Under the ADA Does Not Necessarily Lead to Bizarre Results, 75
Miss. L.J. 1063, 1074, 1083 (2006) (recognizing that "the main argument against reasonable
accommodation for individuals 'regarded as' disabled was that Congress could not have
intended to deny reasonable accommodation to an impaired individual that is not
substantially limited in a major life activity while requiring the same individual to receive
reasonable accommodation simply if their employers regarded their impairment as
substantially limiting a major life activity" but arguing that the plain language and the
legislative history of the ADA both support the interpretation that reasonable
accommodations should be available to "regarded as" plaintiffs); Cynthia A. Crain, The
Struggle For Reasonable Accommodation For "Regarded As" Disabled Individuals, 74 U.
CIN. L. REV. 167, 189 (2005) (suggesting a judicial remedy to the conflict because "The
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Eight and Ninth Circuits also ruled on the issue, but these Circuits
adopted the view that reasonable accommodations to individuals who
are merely "regarded as" disabled are anomalous.10 3 The Second,
Fourth, Seventh and DC Circuits have not directly addressed the issue
at the appellate level,10 4 and in some instances, there is an intra-cir-
cuit split.10 5
United States Supreme Court has a duty to interpret the ADA as intended and provide full
protection to all disabled individuals, whether their impairment arises out of physical,
mental, or attitudinal barriers"). Cf. Jarad M. Lucan, Applying The Americans With
Disabilities Act: Why Giving Traditional Reasonable Accommodation to "Regarded As"
Disabled Individuals Brings About "Bizarre Results," 25 QLR 417, 452 (2006) (concluding
"that the ADA does not obligate employers to provide the same traditional reasonable
accommodation to both actual and 'regarded as' disabled employees [and that] [t]here is no
evidence the ADA's 'regarded as' category was intended to bring a windfall to those
employees whose statutorily defined disability fails to substantially limit a major life
activity").
103. See e.g., Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1231-33 (9th Cir. 2003);
Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916-17 (8th Cir. 1999); Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,
165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir. 1999); Newberry v. E. Texas State Univ., 161 F.3d 276, 280 (5th
Cir. 1998). See also Allen Dudley, Rights to Reasonable Accommodation Under the
Americans With Disabilities Act For "Regarded As" Disabled Individuals, 7 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 389 (1999) (concluding "there is no evidence the ADA's 'regarded as' prong was
intended to benefit those persons who merely have an impairment that actually negatively
impacted their ability to perform the job functions, yet are not substantially limited in a
major life activity" without reconciling this statement with the ADA's plain language's
amenability to a contrary interpretation); Jonathan D. Andrews, Reconciling the Split:
Affording Reasonable Accommodation To Employees "Regarded As" Disabled Under the
ADA - An Exercise in Statutory Interpretation, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 977, 1001 (2001)
(asserting that "regarded as" plaintiffs are not entitled to reasonable accommodations and
stating that "Plain meaning and legislative history are inherently unreliable methods of
statutory interpretation"). Cf. Matthew M. Cannon, Mending A Monumental Mountain:
Resolving Two Critical Circuit Splits Under The American With Disabilities Act For The
Sake Of Logic, Unity, And The Mentally Disabled, 2006 BYU L. REV. 529, 568 (2006)
(advocating for "[tihe Supreme Court [to] resolve the circuit split ... by recognizing an
employer's duty to reasonably accommodate individuals with perceived disabilities
[because] such [a] holding represent[s] the most logical interpretation of the ADA ... .
104. See e.g. Mack v. Strauss, 134 F. Supp. 2d 103, 111 n.3 (D.D.C. 2001) (suggesting
that it seems to be a "logical inconsistency" for a "regarded as" plaintiff to bring a failure to
accommodate claim); Betts v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 145 Fed. Appx. 7, 15 (4th Cir.
2005) (unpublished) (noting that the district court suggested that the ADA's reasonable
accommodation requirement does not apply with equal force to regarded as plaintiffs but
refusing to decide the issue while ruling that the university reasonably accommodated the
plaintiffs perceived disability whether or not it was obliged to do so); Green v. Pace
Suburban Bus, No. 02 C 3031, 2004 WL 1574246, at *11-12 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (recognizing that
while "there is substantial authority that holds that Plaintiffs 'reasonable accommodation'
claim fails at the outset as a matter of law because Plaintiff only claims that he was
'regarded as' disabled," other circuits have decided contrarily, but refusing to address the
issue).
105. Compare Shannon v. New York City Transit Auth., 332 F.3d 95, 105 n.3 (2d Cir.
2003) (noting that it is not clear that "a reasonable accommodation can ever be required in a
'regarded as' case") with Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 161 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
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1. Reasonable Accommodations Should Be Provided to
"Regarded As" Plaintiffs
When a plaintiff is deemed to be "regarded as" disabled within
the meaning of the ADA and is not subsequently given a reasonable
accommodation, a catch-22 tenet materializes whereby "[t]he employee
whose limitations are perceived accurately gets to work, while [the em-
ployee regarded as disabled] is sent home unpaid."10 6
In Kelly v. Metallics West, Inc., the company appealed a judg-
ment against it because they violated the ADA when it refused to
permit an employee to return to work with supplemental oxygen. 10 7
On appeal, the company alleged, inter alia, that the ADA did not re-
quire it to reasonably. accommodate the employee because, as per the
district court finding, she was a "regarded as" disabled plaintiff. 0 It
was undisputed that with supplemental oxygen, the employee was ca-
pable of performing the essential functions of her job.' 0 9 The court
held that based on the plain language of the ADA, the employer was
required to reasonably accommodate a "regarded as" plaintiff." 0 The
court rejected the Ninth Circuit's concern that providing such accom-
modations would lead to "bizarre results.""' According to the Tenth
Circuit, "an employer who is unable or unwilling to shed his or her
stereotypic assumptions based on a faulty or prejudiced perception of
an employee's abilities must be prepared to accommodate the artificial
limitations created by his or her own faulty perceptions." 12 The court
rationalized that the dual purpose of encouraging employers to acquire
knowledge about their employees' real capabilities while protecting
employees who work for employers whose attitudes "remain mired in
prejudice.""13 The court believed the plain language of the ADA com-
pelled the result it reached and that its holding was aligned with
Congress' intent when it drafted the ADA. 14
In Williams v. Philadelphia Housing Authority Police Depart-
ment, the employee was unable to carry a firearm because of a mental
(holding that employees who are regarded as disabled are entitled to reasonable
accommodations under the ADA).
106. See Kelly, 410 F.3d at 671 (quoting Williams, 380 F.3d at 775).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 671, 673.
109. Id. at 672.
110. Id. at 675-76.
111. See id. (citing Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1231-33).
112. Id. at 675.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 676.
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condition; his employer perceived him to be unable to carry a firearm
and to be around others carrying firearms. 115 The employee alleged
that he was qualified to bring suit under the "regarded as" prong be-
cause his employer erroneously perceived him to be unable to work
with, have access to, or be around others carrying, firearms. 1" 6 The
employer argued that even if the employee was "regarded as" disabled
because his impairment was perceived to be greater than it was, the
employee was not entitled to accommodation under the ADA. 1 7 While
the court did not eliminate the possibility that in some instances rea-
sonable accommodations for a "regarded as" employee may produce
strange results, it declined to impose a barrier across the board for
such claims because such a course would be in defiance of the plain
language of the ADA. 118 The court ultimately held that it was faithful
to its interpretation of the ADA and that its choice to interpret the
ADA as permitting reasonable accommodations for the "regarded as"
plaintiff was justified." 9
In Katz v. City Metal Co., Inc., a scrap metal salesman brought
suit after he was terminated following a heart attack. 20 Subsequent
to the heart attack, the employee had difficulty walking, which was
aggravated by cold weather. 12 ' The appellate court held that there
was a question as to whether the employee was actually disabled but
that there was adequate evidence to support a "regarded as" disabled
claim. 122 When the case was in the lower court, the employee testified
that following his surgery, he asked the company if he could return to
work part-time, suggested a reduction in salary, and indicated he
would accept whatever accommodation the company was willing to of-
fer. 123 Because this was one of the early cases involving reasonable
accommodations for a "regarded as" plaintiff, the circuit split had not
yet fully developed. The court took for granted that "Congress, when it
provided for perception to be the basis of disability status, probably
had principally in mind the more usual case in which a plaintiff has a
long-term medical condition of some kind, and the employer exagger-
ates its significance by failing to make a reasonable
115. Williams, 380 F.3d at 755.
116. Id. at 762.
117. Id. at 672-73.
118. Id. at 774.
119. Id.
120. Katz, 87 F.3d at 28.
121. Id. at 29.
122. Id. at 32-33.
123. Id. at 33.
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accommodation."1 24 The court held that "both the language and policy
of the statute . . . offer protection [to someone who] is wrongly per-
ceived to be [disabled]" even in the short term as in the Katz case. 125
Thus, the First Circuit assumed, without explicitly dealing with the
issue, that the protection of reasonable accommodations for "regarded
as" plaintiffs was available under the ADA.126
In D'Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., an employee, discharged
from her position as product transporter, brought suit alleging, inter
alia, that she was perceived as suffering from vertigo.1 27 The appellate
court reversed the district court's summary judgment on the issue be-
cause there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
plaintiff was "regarded as" disabled and whether she could perform the
essential functions of her job in spite of her vertigo condition.128 Plain-
tiff alleged that she could have been reasonably accommodated if the
company would have exempted her from working on the spreader belt
and the box-former belt.129 The court concluded the ADA's "plain lan-
guage required employers to provide reasonable accommodations for
employees they regard as disabled."130 The court noted "in interpret-
ing a statute, it is . . . axiomatic that [the] first step 'is to determine
whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning
with regard to the particular dispute in the case." 131 The court held
the plain language of the ADA "yields no statutory basis for distin-
guishing among individuals who are disabled in the actual-impairment
sense and those who are disabled only in the regarded-as sense" and
therefore, 'regarded as' plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable accommo-
dations under the ADA.132
2. Reasonable Accommodations Should Not Be Provided to
"Regarded As" Plaintiffs
When the plain language of a statute would lead to an "absurd
result," courts must delve beyond the literal interpretation. 133 Because
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 31-33
127. D'Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1221-22.
128. Id. at 1222.
129. Id. at 1224.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1235 (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)).
132. Id. at 1235.
133. See Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1226 (citing Royal Foods Co., Inc. v. RJR Holdings, Inc.,
252 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2001)).
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the plain language meaning of the ADA is the principal rationale used
by courts that interpret the ADA as permitting (and sometimes man-
dating) reasonable accommodations for "regarded as" plaintiffs, courts
that hold contrarily reason that the absurdity of the results compel
them to look beyond the ADA's plain meaning.134
In Kaplan v. City of North Las Vegas, a peace officer was in-
jured in a training exercise, and was thereafter unable to hold a gun or
grasp objects with his right hand, was misdiagnosed as having rheu-
matoid arthritis. 135 The misdiagnosis led the City to believe the
employee's injury was permanent and the City terminated him.136 The
discharged employee filed suit alleging the City terminated him be-
cause they regarded him as being permanently disabled by rheumatoid
arthritis.1 37 Because the employee alleged he was terminated based on
a misdiagnosis, he sought relief under the theory that he was "re-
garded as" a disabled individual.' 38 The court determined the plaintiff
could not perform the essential functions of the job without reasonable
accommodation; then it inquired as to whether a "regarded as" plaintiff
was entitled to reasonable accommodations. 139 While recognizing that
"on its face, the ADA's definition of 'qualified individual with a disabil-
ity' does not differentiate between the three alternative prongs of the
'disability' definition," the court reasoned that "absence of a stated dis-
tinction . . . that is not tantamount to an explicit instruction,"
reasonable accommodations should be provided for "regarded as" plain-
tiffs. 1 4 0 Furthermore, the court noted that accommodating individuals
who are not actually disabled would "compel employers to waste
resources."141
Instead of focusing on the harm that is inflicted on employees
who are misperceived as being disabled, the court considered the bene-
fit that would be conferred on them even though they are not
disabled.' 42 If reasonable accommodations are given, then impaired
individuals "would be better off' if they are treated as "disabled" when
their impairment does not meet the qualifying threshold for actual dis-
134. See, e.g., id. (quoting Weber, 186 F.3d at 917, for the proposition that reasonable
accommodations for regarded as plaintiffs would lead to "bizarre" results).
135. Id. at 1227.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1231.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1232.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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ability under the ADA.143 The court neglected to reconcile this line of
reasoning with the ADA's specific aim to eradicate discrimination
against individuals whose impairments are not severe enough to be
considered actual disabilities, but who are treated by their employers
as having actual disabilities. In addition, the court did not contem-
plate the paradoxical consequence of its ruling - that is, the plaintiff
who can work will not be reinstated, thus remaining without relief.
Such consequences stemming from the court's judgment actually leads
to the real "waste [ofl resources" because here, a qualified individual is
being excluded from the workforce because of his employer's biases. 144
In fact, this court's holding that the employer has no duty to accommo-
date an employee in a "regarded as" case, 145 serves only to perpetuate
the evil the ADA attempted to extinguish with its "regarded as" prong.
In Weber v. Strippit, Inc., an international sales manager who
suffered from a major heart attack and related conditions was asked to
relocate to another office of the employer. 146 He explained to the em-
ployer that his doctor instructed him not to relocate for six months
because of his medical condition. 147 The employer refused to wait for
six months to relocate the employee and either terminated him or he
abandoned the job. 148 The district court granted judgment as a matter
of law on the actual disability claim but reserved the perceived disabil-
ity claim for a jury, which then returned a verdict for defendant. 149 On
appeal, the employee claimed the district court failed to give the jury
an instruction on reasonable accommodation for perceived disabil-
ity.150 The employee also claimed his employer was liable under the
ADA when it failed to reasonably accommodate a perceived disability,
a position the district court and the court of appeals both rejected. 15'
The appeals court reasoned that, "imposing liability on employers who
fail to accommodate non-disabled employees who are simply "regarded
as" disabled would lead to bizarre results." 152 The Weber court then
suggested a hypothetical to clarify its reasoning:
Assume, for instance, that Weber's heart condition prevented him
from relocating to Akron but did not substantially limit any major
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1233.
146. Weber, 186 F.3d at 910.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 910.
150. Id. at 915.
151. Id. at 915-16.
152. Id. at 916.
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life activity. Absent a perceived disability, defendants could termi-
nate Weber without exposing themselves to liability under the
ADA. If the hypothetical is altered, however, such that defendants
mistakenly perceive Weber's heart condition as substantially limit-
ing one or more major life activities, defendants would be required
to reasonably accommodate Weber's condition by, for instance, de-
laying his relocation to Akron. Although Weber's impairment is no
more severe in this example than in the first, Weber would now be
entitled to accommodations for a non-disabling impairment that no
similarly situated employees would enjoy. 153
The Weber court successfully elicited the precise reason why the
employer should have to accommodate the employee. In the first sce-
nario, the employer could terminate the employee without liability if it
has no misperceptions. 54 However, once those misperceptions are for-
mulated (as in the latter part of the hypothetical), the employer would
be held liable for failing to accommodate. 155 The distinguishing factor
is the employer's belief in the existence of a disability the employee
does not have.15 6 Given that the ADA affirmatively protects those who
are perceived as being disabled as well as those who are actually dis-
abled, it is not a long stretch to base the distinction between employer
liability and non-liability on that employer's perceptions or to catego-
rize actions based on false perceptions as discriminatory. In fact, such
a course parallels the way the ADA operates. An employee who has an
impairment that does not rise to the level of an actual disability may
still qualify to bring suit as a "disabled individual" solely because of the
subjective belief of the employer who regards such employee as dis-
abled. The impairment itself would be no more severe, but liability
would be imposed on the employer because it acted based on its mis-
perception. 15 7 As such, the Weber court's hypothetical is self-defeating.
In Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., a discharged employee, who
worked as a packer and a floor person, suffered from irritable bowel
syndrome. 58 The employee filed suit following her termination alleg-
ing the company violated the ADA when it failed to accommodate
her.' 59 It was undisputed that the employee's irritable bowel syn-
drome was an impairment; but, the parties disagreed about whether it
rose to the level of an actual disability by substantially limiting a ma-
153. Id. (emphasis added).
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See Weber, 186 F.3d at 916.
158. Workman, 165 F.3d at 463.
159. Id.
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jor life activity and also whether the employer regarded the employee
as being so limited. 160 The court held it would not be unreasonable for
a jury to conclude that the employer discriminated against the em-
ployee by perceiving her to be disabled, and that the employer's
contention of finding discrimination under this prong would obviate
the employer's obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation was
correct. 161 The court did not give insight into its rationale for its choice
not to mandate reasonable accommodations for "regarded as" plain-
tiffs. In fact, the court did not conduct any textual analysis of the
ADA's plain language to determine what the proper course of action
would be under the statute. As such, this court's holding that reasona-
ble accommodations need not be provided for "regarded as" plaintiffs is
on fragile grounds because the court did not review and analyze other
courts' reasoning, nor did it seek refuge in the language of the statute
for its unsupported opinion.
In Newberry v. East Texas State University, a terminated ten-
ured professor brought suit against his employer claiming that he
suffered from a psychiatric disability, which is a form of obsessive-com-
pulsive personality disorder. 162 Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that he
was perceived as disabled. 163 The plaintiff requested a reasonable ac-
commodation of a year of paid sick leave so he could study art in New
York, which is an accommodation that the employer refused to provide
in the absence of a letter from plaintiffs psychiatrist stating he needed
an accommodation.' 6 4 The court found that the evidence suggested he
was terminated for his work performance and lack of collegiality, and
that under the facts, no reasonable jury could have found that he ei-
ther did not suffer from a disability or that he was dismissed because of
a perception he was disabled. 65 The court concluded that the plaintiff
could only rely on the "regarded as" prong of the ADA and he would
need to show the employer's erroneous perception was a motivating
factor for his dismissal. 66 The court noted, "an employer need not pro-
vide reasonable accommodation to an employee who does not suffer
from a substantially limiting impairment merely because the employer
thinks the employee has such an impairment. " 167 The court looked
160. Id. at 467.
161. Id.
162. Newberry, 161 F.3d at 277-78.
163. Id. at 277.
164. Id. at 278.
165. Id. at 279.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 280.
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only at the instant facts and applied the EEOC regulations discussing
"regarded as" claims to those facts. 168 The court tried to determine
which rationale would be most fitting for that particular plaintiffs "re-
garded as" claim 169 but never considered the reasons why, or situations
when a reasonable accommodation for "regarded as" plaintiffs may be
permissible under the ADA. Even though the Newberry court made a
sweeping and conclusive statement that employers need not provide
reasonable accommodations to "regarded as" plaintiffs,1 70 its analysis
did not review or pertain to the language of the ADA. Its declaration
that reasonable accommodations are not available to "regarded as"
plaintiffs, cannot, therefore, be given much stock for it is not well-rea-
soned or justified.
IV. RECTIFYING THE DISABILITY OF MISPERCEPTION
"Statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to
cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions
of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by
which we are governed."1 71 The first question, therefore, is whether
discrimination against individuals who are regarded as disabled is rea-
sonably comparable to discrimination against actually disabled
individuals. The answer is resoundingly in the affirmative based on
plain reading of the ADA as well as judicial interpretation that has
found "society's accumulated myths and fears about disability and dis-
ease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from
actual impairment. '" 1 72 The second inquiry is whether the degree of
comparability between actual and perceived disability warrants rea-
sonable accommodations for individuals who are "regarded as"
disabled. The answer turns on the comparison between actual disabil-
ity and the specific rationale that applies in a "regarded as" case.' 73
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 277.
171. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
172. Arline, 480 U.S. at 284.
173. See Kristopher J. Ring, Disabling The Split: Should Reasonable Accommodations
Be Provided To "Regarded As" Disabled Individuals Under The Americans With Disabilities
Act (ADA)?, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 311, 313 (2007) (suggesting "that a 'regarded as'
disabled employee who has no actual impairment of any kind should not be entitled to
reasonable accommodations .. , [whereas] a 'regarded as' employee who has an actual
impairment, although not substantially limiting, should be entitled to the social
accommodation of educating the workforce and others about the impairment, but should not
be allowed any other accommodation.").
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A. Reasonable Accommodations Should Be Provided Only for a
Specific Subset of "Regarded As" Plaintiffs
In a "regarded as" case brought under the first rationale - that
is, the individual has an impairment that does not substantially limit
one or more major life activities but which is perceived to be so - there
is conceptual justification for providing an accommodation. The evil of
discrimination against a disabled individual is similar to discrimina-
tion when the person is in fact impaired (even if not in a substantially
limiting way) because in both instances, the person's condition can ac-
tually affect the person's ability to do the job in a particular way. For
example, in the case of the employee who suffered from night blind-
ness, which is a condition that does not qualify as an actual disability,
the employer could have accommodated the employee by letting him
drive only in the daytime. 174 The ADA mandates liability when the
employer discriminates based on false perceptions. 175 Therefore, it is a
natural extension to impose liability on an employer when it fails to
accommodate the employee who is victimized by its discriminatory and
unlawful actions. In interpreting the statute to mean that reasonable
accommodations should be provided to impaired individuals who are
"regarded as" being substantially limited in one or more major life ac-
tivities, courts would stay within the language and spirit of the ADA
without obtaining absurd results. This outlook would be especially
useful when an impaired (but not disabled) employee is qualified to do
a job only if provided with reasonable accommodations and such indi-
vidual is "regarded as being" disabled. In effect, the employer would be
accommodating someone it has already otherwise wronged; it would be
making an alteration to diminish the negative effects of an impairment
that it regards as constituting a disability. The law should treat an
impairment that is "regarded as" being an actual disability as it would
have treated an actual disability.
When a suit is brought under the second rationale whereby a
non-substantially limiting impairment actually substantially limits
one or more major life activities because of the attitudes of others, the
employee would be able to perform his or her job duties were it not for
the debilitating effects of the attitudes of others. In such an instance,
the evil is not comparable to discrimination against an actually dis-
abled person. This type of discrimination is more akin to race
discrimination whereby the plaintiffs' fundamental problem is based
174. See Capobianco, 422 F.3d 47
175. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2). See also LeVelle, 197 Fed. Appx. at 731-32.
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on stereotypes about their abilities. Unlike the first rationale where
the plaintiffs' impairments may call for an accommodation because the
impairment can affect their abilities, the plaintiffs bringing suit under
this second rationale, despite having impairments, are not hindered in
any way in their capabilities absent the negative attitudes that exist
about their impairments. As such, it makes less sense to mandate a
reasonable accommodation. However, such a situation should not be
remediless because the plaintiff is still being restricted because of neg-
ative stereotypes. One way to address such discrimination would be to
award injunctive relief that eliminates the source of the attitudes
based on stereotypes. For example, educating those who are mis-
informed about a particular condition would serve to eradicate
irrational fears and would detoxify the work environment.
When a "regarded as" case is brought under the rationale that
the individual has no impairment, but is perceived as having a sub-
stantially limiting one, it would lead to "bizarre" results if the non-
impairment were reasonably accommodated. In fact, such a course is
inherently unreasonable. For example, if an employee with a superfi-
cial scar on his face files suit because his employer took adverse
employment action against him when it regarded him as being dis-
abled, that individual is entitled to a remedy under the ADA for the
plain discrimination claim if the employer regarded him as being sub-
stantially limited in a major life activity (which here, could be working
since the employer may think the individual is unable to perform a
broad class of jobs). However, such an individual should not be able to
bring a failure to accommodate claim. Logically, if that person has no
impairment, there is no reason to accommodate him or her and one
would be hard-pressed to find an accommodation for an impairment
that does not exist. To give practical application to the hypothetical,
assume that an individual with a superficial scar applies for a position
as a customer service representative at a bank and the employer be-
lieves that such individual is disabled because the apparent
disfigurement will substantially limit him as he interacts with custom-
ers in any in-person customer service job. The person is, in fact, able to
perform all the essential functions of the job and his superficial scar is
not an impairment within the meaning of the ADA. Should the em-
ployer provide a reasonable accommodation for this employee? The
answer is no because there is no impairment to accommodate. This
employee can perform all the essential (and non-essential) functions of
the position. Providing a reasonable accommodation in this situation
defies common sense. It makes more sense for the employer to relin-
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quish his false beliefs and curb any related discriminatory actions,
both of which can be accomplished by some form of equitable relief.176
The cases brought under prong two are analogous to cases
brought under prong three because, in both situations, removing the
attitudes that led to discriminatory actions will cure the problem. As
such, cases brought under prongs two and three should be remedied
the same way. Under prong two, as illustrated in the cases discussing
this prong, the attitudes that lead to the impairment being substan-
tially limiting could be those of persons outside of the covered entity's
employ - "others" - but the employer would still have to subscribe to
stereotypic attitudes and act in accord with them to be liable. Injunc-
tive relief would address the employer's attitudes, which, once
eliminated, would lead to no substantial limitation. In the same vein,
prong three cases address discriminatory treatment taken by a "cov-
ered entity" because of its belief. The varied wording between prong
two - which states "substantially limits ... only as a result of others" -
and prong three - which states "has none of the impairments.., but is
treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting [one]" 177 -
is a distinction without a difference because, in both cases, quelling the
employer's attitudes that led to the discrimination would provide ade-
quate remedy for the problem. Even though attitudes under prong two
may be pervasive in society (and not limited to the population within
the workforce) and attitudes under prong three must be those of the
employer, the employer in either situation, will only be liable if it acts
discriminatorily since it regards the employee as disabled - irrespec-
tive of the stereotypes held by others in society generally.
Contrary to the various holdings circuits have taken, it is a mis-
take to strictly hold that reasonable accommodations should be
provided or denied across the board. The ADA mandates a case-by-
case analysis for almost every inquiry dealing with the ADA. This sit-
uation should be no different. 178 However, the alternative of having no
176. This is an appropriate situation for equitable relief because a legal remedy of
monetary damages will be inadequate to realize the spirit of the ADA. Even if a plaintiff is
compensated (with legal damages) for being regarded as disabled, the ADA aims to free
workplaces (as a whole) of disability based discrimination, which, in this situation, can only
be accomplished through equitable means.
177. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (emphasis added). See also discussion supra Part I.
178. See Lawrence D. Rosenthal, Reasonable Accommodations For Individuals
Regarded As Having Disabilities Under The American With Disabilities Act? Why "No"
Should Not Be The Answer, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 895, 969 (2006) (recommending a case-
by-case approach which would "consider: (1) who is responsible for the employer's
perception of the employee's 'disability'; (2) into which prong of the 'regarded as' definition
the employee fits; (3) whether providing an accommodation in such a case would yield a
bizarre result; and (4) the nature of the accommodation requested").
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rules to guide employees and employers is equally unwelcome and un-
helpful. Congress should amend the ADA to specify when a reasonable
accommodation claim is cognizable and it should enact an appropriate
remedial scheme for "regarded as" plaintiffs.
B. Title I of the ADA Should Be Amended
As it currently exists, the ADA's plain language covers discrimi-
nation when a qualified individual is treated differently because of a
disability and when a qualified individual with a disability is denied a
reasonable accommodation. 179 The courts have construed the ADA's
provisions by recognizing two distinct types of claims: discrimination
based on disability and failure to accommodate.180 In amending Title I
of the ADA by adding the following italic text to, and deleting the fol-
lowing stricken text from, the respective sections, Congress can clarify
the breadth of the ADA's coverage.
§12112. Discrimination
(b) As used in this subsection (a) of this section, the term "discrimi-
nate" includes-
5 (A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known
actual or perceived physical or mental impairments limitations of
an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an appli-
cant or employee, unless the perceived impairment substantially
limits one or more major life activities only as a result of the atti-
tudes of others toward such impairment or the perceived
impairment is non-existent; notwithstanding this provision (5(A)), a
covered entity is entitled to an affirmative defense when it fails to
reasonably accommodate if such covered entity can demonstrate
that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of the business of such covered entity; or
(B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or
employee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability,
if such denial is based on the need of such covered entity to make
reasonable accommodation to the actual or perceived physical or
mental impairments of the employee or applicant unless the per-
ceived impairment substantially limits one or more major life
activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such im-
pairment or the perceived impairment is non-existent; or
(C) failing to implement measures to promptly correct ad-
verse employment actions taken because the covered entity regards
the individual as disabled if the perceived impairment is substan-
tially limiting one or more major life activities only as a result of the
179. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2000).
180. See, e.g., Norcross v. Sneed, 755 F.2d 113 (8th Cir. 1985); Wernick v. Fed. Reserve
Bank, 91 F.3d 379 (2d Cir. 1996).
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attitudes of others toward such impairment or the perceived impair-
ment is non-existent but is treated by the covered entity as
substantially limiting one or more major life activities.
V. CONCLUSION
"It is never too late to give up our prejudices," wrote Henry
David Thoreau.181 The verity of this statement is the reason not all
"regarded as" plaintiffs should be reasonably accommodated. Employ-
ers can give up their prejudices. Instead of fertilizing false perceptions
by treating them as if they reflect reality, we should eradicate them
from the workplace. However, values and fears that have been incul-
cated in individuals for many generations are harder to exterminate.
When situations materialize where employers base employment deci-
sions on preconceived notions that have no foundation in truth, there
should be a penalty. This paper has suggested that Congress amend
the ADA to ensure such a penalty for employers who conform to igno-
rance and myth. As argued in this comment, adhering to broad rules
about reasonable accommodations for all "regarded as" plaintiffs is an
ill-advised course. Instead, Congress should carve out malleable rules
that courts can use as a guide in conducting case-by-case inquiries to
determine when reasonable accommodations are appropriate for "re-
garded as" plaintiffs.
181. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN 7 (Digireads.com Publ'g 2005).
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